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“Information technology allows for ﬁne-grained observation and analysis of consumer be-
haviour. This allows for various kinds of marketing strategies that were previously extremely
difﬁcult to carry out, at least on a large scale. For example, a seller can offer prices and
goods that are differentiated by individual behaviour and/or characteristics.”
Hal Varian (2003), Economics of Information Technology.
Economists have long been interested in understanding the proﬁt, consumer sur-
plus and welfare effects of an ancient marketing strategy: Price Discrimination.
Whileitisnotnewthatﬁrmstryfrequentlytosegmentcustomersinordertoprice
discriminate, what has dramatically changed, with recent advances in information
technologies,isthequalityofconsumer-speciﬁcdatanowavailableinmanymarkets
and how this information has been used by ﬁrms for price discrimination purposes.
Speciﬁcally, thanks to information technology it is nowadays increasingly feasible
for sellers to segment customers on the basis of their purchasing histories and to
price discriminate accordingly. This form of price discrimination has been named in
the literature as Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD).1
For a long time economists have been concerned in understanding the economic
effects of price discrimination in monopolistic markets.2 However, because imper-
fect competition is undoubtedly the most common economic setting, recent research
on the ﬁeld has been concerned with the following issues. Firstly, how are proﬁt,
consumer surplus and welfare affected when ﬁrms practice some form of price dis-
crimination in imperfectly competitive markets? Secondly, in which circumstances
may competitive ﬁrms have an incentive to price discriminate or rather to avoid it?
Rosa Branca Esteves
NIPE and Department of Economics, University of Minho, e-mail: rbranca@eeg.uminho.pt
1 For a comprehensive survey on behaviour-based price discrimination, see also Fudenberg and
Villas-Boas (2007).
2 For a survey of price discrimination with monopoly see, for instance, Varian (1989).
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As we will see, conclusions regarding the proﬁt and welfare effects of price dis-
crimination are strongly dependent upon the form of price discrimination, which in
turn depends upon the form of consumer heterogeneity and the different instruments
available for price discrimination. Basically, the aim of this survey is to clarify the
two aforementioned issues in imperfectly competitive markets.
2 Some Useful Concepts
Broadly speaking, price discrimination exists when the difference in prices among
consumers is not proportional to the difference in marginal costs (e.g. Stigler (1987)
and Stole (2007)). Obviously, as in monopoly settings, under imperfect competition
price discrimination is only feasible if the following conditions are satisﬁed: (i)
ﬁrms must have some market power; otherwise the law of one price applies; (ii)
ﬁrms must be able to segment consumers, either directly or indirectly (i.e. through
the use of self selection mechanisms) and, (iii) ﬁrms must be able to prevent resale
or, equivalently, arbitrage across differently priced goods must be prevented.3
In a recent paper, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000, p. 637) noticed that “...there are
moreformsofpricediscriminationthanthestandardtypologysuggests...”.Thestan-
dardtypologyofpricediscriminationformsgoesbacktoPigou(1920)andistheone
adopted in almost all textbooks. Following Pigou there are three types of price dis-
crimination. First-degree price discrimination arises when the ﬁrm is able to charge
adifferentpriceperunitofproductandperconsumer,whichundermonopolymeans
that the ﬁrm is able to extract all consumer surplus. (We will see below that under
competition ﬁrst-degree price discrimination will in general leave some consumer
surplus.)Mostrecently,economistshavedeﬁnedsecond-degreepricediscrimination
as the practice of discriminating on the basis of unobserved consumer heterogeneity.
Thus, the ﬁrm offers a menu of products and prices and consumers self-select into
the appropriate niche of the market. Lastly, under third-degree price discrimination,
perhaps the most evident form of price discrimination, the ﬁrm can discriminate on
the basis of observable and veriﬁable consumer characteristics (e.g. past purchas-
ing decisions, age, gender, geographical location, etc.). In the context of the new
information markets, Shapiro and Varian (1999) recover the Pigou’s terminologies
of price discrimination but give them different designations, respectively: (i) per-
sonalised pricing: sell to each customer at a possibly different price; (ii) versioning:
offer a product line and let users choose the version of the product most appro-
priate for them; and (iii) group pricing: set different prices for different groups of
consumers.
Latest work on price discrimination has pointed out new ways of categorising
different forms of price discrimination. Armstrong and Vickers (2001) notice that
price discrimination may take the form of interpersonal discrimination or intrap-
3 Some of the mechanisms ﬁrms can use to prevent resale can be found in Carlton and Perloff
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ersonal discrimination.4 This classiﬁcation is based on whether ﬁrms discriminate
across consumers or across units for the same consumer. Interpersonal price dis-
crimination is present when different consumers face different price-marginal cost
ratios (i.e., the variation in prices is across consumers). Using the Amazon’s story
example when it charges different prices to loyal and ﬁrst-time consumers it is able
to sort the consumers into different segments and charge each segment a different
price. In doing so, the ﬁrm is using interpersonal price discrimination. In contrast,
intrapersonalpricediscriminationispresentwhenthesameconsumerfacesdifferent
price-marginal cost ratios across the portfolio of goods purchased. When Amazon
sends a given loyal consumer a special e-mail promotion for a particular book plus a
DVD that does not correspond to the price that same consumer would pay if buying
separately each of the goods, it is using intrapersonal price discrimination.
As well as categorising price discrimination strategies as either interpersonal or
intrapersonal, Stole (2007) claims that it is also useful to categorise price discrim-
ination strategies according to whether the form of consumer heterogeneity is ob-
servable or not. In this regard, price discrimination is either direct or indirect. Direct
price discrimination arises when price discrimination is based on some observable
demand related characteristic (e.g. third-degree, location based, behaviour-based,
etc.). In contrast, indirect price discrimination arises if consumer heterogeneity is
not directly observable and ﬁrms need to rely on self-selection mechanisms to indi-
rectly separate consumers (e.g. nonlinear pricing).
Finally, within the terminology of direct and interpersonal third-degree price dis-
crimination, we present a new form of price discrimination in which ﬁrms offer
different deals (e.g. prices, discounts or coupons) to its own customers and to the
rivals’ previous consumers. Indeed, it is generally the case that ﬁrms offer better
deals to those consumers that bought from rival ﬁrms before. Broadly speaking, the
main goal of this marketing strategy is to generate proﬁtable incremental sales with-
out damaging the proﬁts a ﬁrm can extract from its own customer base. While Chen
(1997) calls this strategy paying customers to switch, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)
call it customer poaching.
In light of the above, this survey will address the proﬁt, consumer surplus and
welfare implications of direct and interpersonal price discrimination in competitive
settings. In the subsequent study a dichotomy is established. We begin with those
papers that have focused on price discrimination strategies in static frameworks.
Within this class of works we will examine models where ﬁrms have the required
information to price discriminate on an individual basis (i.e., ﬁrst-degree price dis-
crimination) and on a segment basis (i.e., third-degree price discrimination). After-
wards, we will examine a relevant class of models that have extended third-degree
price discrimination to dynamic settings. In this latter case, price discrimination is
based on information about consumers’ past purchasing behaviour.
As usual in the literature, the evaluation of the economic effects of price discrim-
ination will be discussed in relation to the benchmark case where price discrimina-
tion is for any reason not permitted. In other words, we will compare proﬁts, con-
4 Because this survey will not focus on intrapersonal price discrimination the interested reader may
look at Armstrong and Vickers (2001) for a detailed discussion of this form of price discrimination.4 Rosa Branca Esteves
sumer surplus and welfare when departing from a setting where ﬁrms set uniform
prices to one where price discrimination is introduced.
3 Competitive Price Discrimination in Static Settings
As was once suggested by Louis Phlips (1988, p.18) in his book on The Economics
of Price Discrimination, “If you can discriminate, it is proﬁtable to do so. (...) a
discriminating price policy is at least as proﬁtable as a nondiscriminating one.”
While this basic principle is widely accepted for a monopolistic ﬁrm with market
power we will see that this may no longer be the case in an imperfect competi-
tive setting. Under monopolistic price discrimination the only effect at work is the
surplus extraction effect, through which price discrimination allows the seller to ex-
tract more consumer surplus than it could extract under uniform pricing. In contrast,
when we introduce competition into the market this is no longer the case, as each
ﬁrm needs to take into account the strategic effects of its actions. In competitive
settings there is another effect at work, namely the business stealing effect. Accord-
ing to this latter effect, in competitive environments price discrimination may act to
intensify competition. Whereas the surplus extraction effect tends to increase proﬁts
the intensiﬁed competition effect tends to reduce them. Thus, whether proﬁts fall or
rise with discrimination depends upon which effect dominates. As will be explained
the ﬁnal outcome depends in turn on the speciﬁcity of markets.
The literature on price discrimination in competitive settings is not as extensive
as that under monopoly settings. One very important model to assess the compet-
itive effects of price discrimination is that proposed by Thisse and Vives (1988).
They consider a standard Hotelling (1929) duopoly model of spatial price discrim-
ination, where the two ﬁrms directly observe the location of each consumer on a
linear market. Thus, direct price discrimination is implemented if ﬁrms can base
their prices on consumer location. Additionally, since ﬁrms set their prices on a
consumer’s location basis this is clearly an example of ﬁrst-degree price discrimi-
nation. In this framework, Thisse and Vives show that price discrimination acts to
intensify competition in each location. Like in Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse
and Vives show that the best price the more distant ﬁrm may set in equilibrium is
the marginal cost, and that the closest ﬁrm needs to provide the same utility level
in order to make a sale. As a result of that, they show that all prices might fall in
relation to uniform pricing. To be precise, if the distribution of consumers is uni-
form and includes the end points of the market then all prices fall down except the
price charged to consumers located exactly at the mill, which remain unchanged.5
5 Although the Thisse and Vives model has been usually referred as a model where under competi-
tion price discrimination leads all prices to fall, the reader should take into account that this result
is specially true when consumers are uniformly distributed say on the interval [0;1]: It is important
to say that the Thisse and Vives model does not always reduce all prices with discrimination. The
interested reader may consider the following two examples. First, assume each consumer has an
observable location x uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]; transport cost is t and marginalA Survey on the Economics of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination 5
In contrast, price discrimination by a multiplant monopolist would lead to increased
prices and proﬁts relatively to uniform pricing.
Therefore, in this duopoly model moving from uniform pricing to a discrimina-
tory pricing policy leads to more aggressive pricing in every location, and thereby
all prices fall as well as proﬁts.6 Since the intensiﬁed competition effect is clearly
the dominant one, ﬁrms are worse off with the ability to price discriminate. As this
model deals with unit inelastic demands and the market is always covered in equi-
librium, conclusions regarding the consumer surplus and welfare effects of price
discrimination are straightforward and immediate. As prices fall to every consumer,
it immediately follows that consumer surplus is higher with price discrimination.
However, because all consumers buy one unit of product either under uniform pric-
ing either under discrimination, and all consumers buy from the closest ﬁrm in both
regimes, welfare is not affected by the ability of ﬁrms to price discriminate.
Going back to the second question we have stated in the beginning of this sur-
vey, as competitive price discrimination intensiﬁes competition and leads to lower
proﬁts, it is natural to wonder whether ﬁrms may have an incentive to avoid price
discrimination, perhaps through commitments to uniform pricing. This type of
concerns was also present in Thisse and Vives’s (1988) analysis, who investigate
whether ﬁrms may ﬁnd individually optimal to avoid price discrimination by com-
mitting publicly to uniform pricing. To address this issue they add an initial stage
in which each ﬁrm may decide to commit to uniform pricing or not. In the second
stage, both ﬁrms observe any ﬁrst stage commitments and set their prices accord-
ingly. Interestingly, they show that when ﬁrms commit publicly to any of the two
pricing policies, price discrimination is always a dominant strategy, and thereby
ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves in the well known Prisoner’s dilemma—both ﬁrms would like
to commit collectively to uniform pricing but individually price discrimination is a
dominant strategy. (This result is not a surprise as all else equal each ﬁrm prefers to
use more instruments rather than fewer (see Phlips (1988).)
More recently, stimulated by advances in information technologies some re-
searchers have extended the Thisse and Vives’s (1988) model to analyse the com-
petitive effects that arise when ﬁrms can tailor special prices, discounts or coupons
either to individual customers or to speciﬁc consumer segments.
Ulph and Vulkan (2000), for instance, have recovered the Thisse and Vives’s
model to investigate whether it is in the interest of ﬁrms to set personalised prices
(i.e. to ﬁrst degree price discriminate) in the context of e-commerce markets. The
production costs are null. It is well known that without discrimination the equilibrium price is t:
Second, consider the same assumptions as before but now suppose that consumers are distributed
on [0;1] with density f (x) = 6x(1 x): In this case, the reader may conﬁrm that the equilibrium
price without discrimination is 2
3t: Since in both examples prices with discrimination do not de-
pend on the distribution and belong to the interval [0;t] it immediately follows that in the ﬁrst
example the discrimination prices are below the non-discrimination price. In contrast, in the sec-
ond example, the no discrimination price is between the discrimination prices. Thus, in this latter
case price discrimination does not reduce all prices.
6 Esteves and Pinto (2009a) extend the Thisse and Vives model to a framework where each ﬁrm’s
production cost is its private information. They investigate the proﬁt and consumer effects of price
discrimination in a model where ﬁrms act as bidders in an auction.6 Rosa Branca Esteves
main difference between the two models is that Ulph and Vulkan use a general trans-
port cost technology, which has the linear one used by Thisse and Vives as a special
case. Additionally, they replace the location interpretation by any form of product
differentiation (e.g. brand loyalty). For the Thisse and Vives reasons, they ﬁnd that
it is generally the case that price discrimination leads to lower proﬁts for both ﬁrms.
Particularly, they show that if some consumers are very loyal and some do not, then
although discrimination can lead to higher prices to most loyal consumers it leads to
lower prices to those consumers located in the middle. Even when ﬁrms are able to
appropriate some consumer surplus due to discrimination, this may not be enough to
overcome the negative effects of intensiﬁed competition. They show that only when
there is a bias towards very strong loyalty will discrimination improve proﬁts. (Only
when most consumers are strong loyal to one of the ﬁrms will the surplus extraction
effect dominate the intensiﬁed competition effect, thereby allowing proﬁts to rise.)
Let us turn now to direct and interpersonal third-degree price discrimination in
environments of imperfect competition. A relevant article shedding some light on
the price, proﬁts and consumer welfare effects of this form of price discrimination in
oligopoly models with product differentiation is Corts (1998). Following Corts there
are two distinct models of price competition with product differentiation. While
some markets exhibit best-response symmetry others exhibit best-response asymme-
try. Best-response symmetry is present when the “strong” and the “weak” markets
of each ﬁrm coincide.7 In contrast, best-response asymmetry is present when the
weak and the strong market of each ﬁrm differ (i.e., when one ﬁrm’s weak market
is the other’s strong market and vice-versa). Particularly, he shows that in models
exhibiting best-response symmetry, the uniform price lies between the two discrim-
inatory prices. Like in monopolistic models of third-degree price discrimination, the
welfareeffectsofpricediscriminationinmodelsdisplayingbest-responsesymmetry
is in general ambiguous.
Conversely, he demonstrates that when one ﬁrm’s weak market is the other’s
strong market unambiguous price, proﬁt and consumer welfare effects may arise.
Regarding the effects of price discrimination on prices, he shows that it is possible
that all prices fall with price discrimination—which he designates as all-out com-
petition result—or all prices rise—which he terms as all-out prices increases. As a
result of that, with all-out competition, price discrimination clearly leads to lower
proﬁts but higher consumer surplus. (With best-response asymmetry, all-out com-
petition will in generally occur if price discrimination intensiﬁes competition and
the strategic complementarity of pricing is strong enough.) In contrast, with all-out
prices increases, price discrimination has opposite effects: ﬁrms are better off while
consumers are worse off. Nevertheless, it is important to say that even within best-
response asymmetry the welfare effects are not immediately obvious. If with all-out
competition aggregate output increases price discrimination is welfare improving.
However, as will become clear below it may happen that welfare remains constant
or even decreases with all-out competition. This latter result tends to occur in mod-
7 Consider the existence of two markets 1 and 2 and two ﬁrms A and B. Following Stole (2003),
market 1 is ﬁrm A’s strong market (whilst market 2 is its weak market) if, for any uniform price set
by ﬁrm B, the optimal price in market 1 is always higher than the price in market 2.A Survey on the Economics of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination 7
els where there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output and
where price discrimination uniquely gives rise to inefﬁcient shopping (e.g. when due
to price discrimination some consumers buy from the more distant ﬁrm).
The Thisse and Vives’s (1988) model presented above is, of course, an example
of a market exhibiting best-response asymmetry. Indeed, this is in general the rule
in models of price discrimination based on location: the far away market from one
ﬁrm (i.e. its weak market) is the strong market for the other ﬁrm. We have seen that
as price discrimination strongly intensiﬁes competition in each segment all prices
might fall down as well as proﬁts, leading to all-out competition. However, be-
cause the market is completely covered and demands are inelastic we have seen that
though consumers are clearly better off with discrimination, welfare remains con-
stant. (Here when ﬁrms price discriminate all consumers buy from the nearest ﬁrm.
Thus, there is no inefﬁcient shopping.)
Notwithstanding this survey focus on models that exhibit best-response asym-
metry, it is worth presenting the Holmes’s (1989) article within the approach of
best-response symmetry. He extends the Robinson’s (1933) seminal article on third-
degree price discrimination with monopoly,8 to examine the proﬁts and welfare ef-
fectsofthisformofpricediscriminationinasymmetricduopolymodelwithproduct
differentiation.9 Additionally, he provides a useful result to predict in which circum-
stances will aggregate output (and therefore welfare) increase or decrease with the
introduction of price discrimination. Whether aggregate output will rise or fall with
discrimination depends not only on the convexity-concavity properties of industry
demands—as in monopoly—but also upon the ratio of market to cross-price elas-
ticities, which stresses the effect of competition. Under linear demand functions he
ﬁnds that when the elasticity ratio condition is satisﬁed proﬁt as well as output (and
welfare) increases. Conversely, when the elasticity ratio condition is violated while
the effect on proﬁts is ambiguous, welfare falls down with discrimination. More pre-
cisely, if in relation to the strong market, the weak market has a higher cross-price
elasticity but lower market elasticity then proﬁts are lower with price discrimina-
tion.10
Recently, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) propose a new framework to investigate
the proﬁts and welfare effects of interpersonal and intrapersonal price discrimina-
tion in competitive settings (i.e., they model ﬁrms supplying utility directly to con-
sumers). Within the interpersonal approach they discuss a model similar to Holmes
8 Robinson (1933) analyses a monopolist which third-degree price discriminates on the basis of
weak and strong market segments. As usual under monopoly the price charged to consumers in the
strong market is higher than the price charged to consumers in the weak market.
9 In Holmes (1989) not only is the ranking of weak and strong markets symmetric, but own-price
and cross-price elasticities are also identical.
10 Let em
i be the market elasticity of demand and ec
i be cross-price elasticity of demand in market
i = s;w where s stands for strong and w stands for weak markets respectively. Then when demands
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(1989). Particularly, they analyse a duopoly model where ﬁrms face two separate
market segments, with each segment being a Hotelling market with uniformly dis-
tributed consumers and with distinct “transport costs”. In this framework, they show
that if there is enough competition (i.e., low enough transport costs), price discrim-
ination increases proﬁts and reduces consumer surplus and welfare. In this way,
they suggest that the Holmes’s (1989) result that proﬁts may fall is a consequence
of relatively uncompetitive markets. In light of the two previous models, as Stole
(2007) notices, it can be said that there is a consensus that in settings exhibiting
best-response symmetry it is very often the case that price discrimination increases
proﬁts.
Finally, we focus next on the aforementioned form of interpersonal direct third-
degree price discrimination in which ﬁrms offer different deals (e.g. prices, dis-
counts or coupons) to its own customers and to the rival’s consumers.11 In other
words, each ﬁrm observes directly to which ﬁrm each individual consumer be-
longs and price discriminates accordingly. Clearly, this type of model exhibits best-
response asymmetry.
While much of the work that has been produced in this form of price discrimi-
nation deals with dynamic settings (as we will see in the next section), Shaffer and
Zhang (2000) propose a static model to investigate whether duopolistic ﬁrms should
offer better deals to its own customers—i.e. follow a pay to stay strategy—or to the
rival’s customers—i.e. follow a pay to switch strategy. The model is static in the
sense that they do not investigate how ﬁrms obtain the required information for
price discrimination.12 They consider a duopoly model where each ﬁrm faces two
separate groups of consumers: its loyal customers and the rival’s loyal customers.
However, as they assume that one group’s average loyalty may be higher than the
other group’s average loyalty, the model allows for asymmetric demands. Addition-
ally, they assume that ﬁrms are asymmetric in size given that, all else equal, one ﬁrm
has a higher initial market share. When the average loyalty of the two groups is not
very dissimilar each ﬁrm’s more (cross-price) elastic group is the rival’s customers
group, that is each ﬁrm’s weak market is the other’s strong market. In this case
the model exhibits best-response asymmetry and each ﬁrm should pay customers to
switch (i.e. offer a lower price to the rival’s customers). As expected, they show that
in a symmetric market (i.e. equal average loyalty across groups) both ﬁrms offer
lower prices to the rival’s customers; price discrimination intensiﬁes competition
thereby leading to all-out competition. In contrast, they show that if the average loy-
alty of the two groups is too dissimilar, then the ﬁrm which own customers are not
11 For modelswhere ﬁrms price discriminate among customers withdifferent brand loyaltieson the
basis of coupons see, for instance, Shaffer and Zhang (1995). They ﬁnd that price discrimination
leads to a prisoner’s dilemma.
12 We will see in the next section that much of the literature on this kind of price discrimination
looks at two-period models, in which consumers’ purchases in the initial period reveal their prefer-
ences from one of the ﬁrms. Conversely, Shaffer and Zhang (2000) exclude any prior competition,
and assume that ﬁrms are able to infer a consumer’s preference on the basis of internal sources of
information such as ﬁrm’s transactions databases or from specialised information vendors. There-
fore, it can be said that their model corresponds to the second period of models analysed in the
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very loyal ﬁnds that group the more elastic one, and thereby it should pay customers
to stay (i.e., offer a better deal to its own customers). Thus, while one ﬁrm charges
a lower price to the rival’s customers the other charges a lower price to its own cus-
tomers. The proﬁt effects of price discrimination are strongly dependent upon the
relative loyalty and ﬁrm’s size. Particularly, they show that if the ﬁrm, which has a
larger baseline market share, follows a pay to stay strategy while the smaller ﬁrm
follows a pay to switch strategy then it may happen that price discrimination may
lessen price competition, thereby increasing the smaller ﬁrm’s proﬁts or even both
ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
Finally, Esteves (2008) extends the Thisse and Vives (1988) model by assuming
that each ﬁrm observes a (less than perfect) signal of a consumer’s brand preference,
and that one ﬁrm’s signal is not seen by its rival. As expected it is found that when
ﬁrms rely on very accurate information they behave more aggressively leading all
pricesandproﬁtstofall.Inspiteofﬁrmsbeingabletoraisetheirpricestoconsumers
recognised as loyal, even when the signal is highly imperfect it is shown that ﬁrms
are worse off if they have the ability to price discriminate. In this way, this paper
puts forward that collectively it is not in the interest of ﬁrms to improve the quality
of their information about customers, however a ﬁrm might individually prefer to do
so.13 Further, because consumers are expected to pay lower prices, the it is shown
that consumers are strictly better off when ﬁrms recognise them more accurately
while proﬁts and welfare are unambiguously worse off.14 Remarkably, this suggests
that any public policy protecting consumer privacy by restricting customer recog-
nition would beneﬁt all competing ﬁrms but at the expense of consumer welfare.
Additionally, Esteves (2008) lays out the conceptual issues that arise when ﬁrms
price discriminate on the basis of public and inaccurate information. The results de-
rived in this extension reinforce the idea that consumers clearly beneﬁt when ﬁrms
recognise them more accurately and in the same way given that this would lead to
more aggressive behaviour and to lower expected prices for everyone. By contrast,
proﬁts and welfare move in an opposite direction. Extending the model to public
information suggests that it is not in the interest of ﬁrms to share their private in-
formation with their competitors. However, it is in the best interest of consumers to
allow ﬁrms to recognise them accurately. Paradoxically, the paper stresses that any
regulation trying to restrict information sharing would most likely beneﬁt ﬁrms’
proﬁtability and overall welfare but again at the expense of consumers.
13 A similar result is obtained by Liu and Serfes (2004) who propose a model that encompasses
perfect and imperfect price discrimination. They show that equilibrium proﬁts are U-shaped in the
precision of information about brand preferences: proﬁt is lowest when the ﬁrms have information
that is less precise than the perfect information in the Thisse-Vives framework.
14 In his book The Economics of E-commerce, Nir Vulkan (2003) states that“...if ﬁrms cannot
gain from perfect price discrimination, they have even fewer incentives to charge individual prices
when they can discriminate only partially.” The results derived in chapter 2 challenge Vulkan’s
conclusion as they suggest that ﬁrms are unequivocally better off when they only have the ability
to price discriminate imperfectly.10 Rosa Branca Esteves
4 Competitive Price Discrimination in Dynamic Settings
This survey has focused so far on competitive price discrimination in static settings.
However, as aforementioned a new price discrimination tool has become available
for ﬁrms, namely each consumer’s purchasing history. As ﬁrms become able to
recognise its previous customers they can offer different prices to old and new cus-
tomers, which clearly is a kind of dynamic (direct and interpersonal) third-degree
price discrimination.
Whereas static settings are a useful framework to investigate how price discrimi-
nation, based for instance on consumer-speciﬁc information, will affect ﬁrms’ prof-
its and welfare, they are silent about any prior competition and about the dynamic
effects of price discrimination. When ﬁrms price discriminate by observing each
customer past purchasing behaviour some interesting questions arise. First, how can
ﬁrms obtain the required information for price discrimination? Second, as ﬁrms
foresee the future effects of price discrimination enabled by customer recognition,
will they change their current pricing behaviour? Are ﬁrst-period prices above or
below the non-discrimination levels? Third, what are the overall proﬁt, consumer
surplus, and welfare effects of price discrimination? These and other related issues
have given rise to a series of papers in which ﬁrms offer different deals to customers
with different past behaviour proﬁles.
Different approaches have been considered in the literature so far. In one ap-
proach purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs, in
other approach purchase history discloses information about a consumer’s exoge-
nousbrandpreference.Inthepreviousapproachesconsumersareperfectlyinformed
and there is no role for advertising. A third approach assumes that advertising is
needed to transmit information to otherwise uninformed consumers. Consumers are
ex-ante identical regarding their preferences for the ﬁrms, however, in contrast to
the switching costs approach, after advertising decisions have been made, some con-
sumers are endogenously locked in with a certain ﬁrm, not due to the existence of
switching costs, but rather because they ignore the other ﬁrm. A common feature in
these approaches is that price discrimination can only be implemented after ﬁrms
have observed the ﬁrst-period actions of consumers (i.e., in the initial period con-
sumers are anonymous). In what follows it is assumed that ﬁrms cannot commit
themselves in the ﬁrst period to long-term prices.15
4.1 Homogeneous Products and Exogenous Switching Costs
The works within the switching costs approach are motivated by those industries
where consumers often need to incur a switching cost if they decide to move from
one supplier to another (e.g. due to the existence of subscription fees, transactions
15 Forananalysisofpurchasehistorypricingwithlong-termcommitmentseeCaminalandMatutes
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costs or costs of learning to use a new product).16 Despite the fact that goods are ini-
tially homogeneous, after purchase decisions have been taken, due to the existence
of switching costs, consumers are in the next stage of the game partially locked in
with their initial sellers. In this setting, when ﬁrms are able to recognise their own
customers and to separate them from the rival’s ones, they will try to entice the latter
group of customers to switch by offering them a better deal.
The ﬁrst set of models investigating dynamic third-price discrimination in mar-
kets with switching costs are Nilssen (1992), Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003).17
Nilssen (1992) is the earliest discussion on third-degree price discrimination in a
market with switching costs. However, his main goal is to discuss how two dif-
ferent types of switching costs—transaction costs and learning costs—affect the
market outcomes.18 A crucial feature of Nilssen’s model is that because there is
no uncertainty about the size of switching costs and all consumers are identical, in
spite of ﬁrms offering discounts to entice consumers to switch no consumer actually
switches in equilibrium.
The focus in Chen (1997) is to investigate the competitive effects of paying cus-
tomers to switch. Particularly, he studies a two-period duopoly model with homo-
geneous products and where switching costs are uniformly distributed. After ﬁrst
period purchase decisions have been taken, each consumer is partially locked in
with his current supplier. In the second period, by observing each consumer’s past
behaviour, each ﬁrm is able to recognise its own customers (i.e., its strong market)
and to offer better deals to the rival’s previous customers (i.e., its weak market). As
both ﬁrms try to entice each other’s previous customers the second-period market
exhibits all-out competition: in comparison to uniform pricing, price discrimination
lowers all segment second period prices,19 raises consumer surplus and lowers prof-
its. Furthermore, as ﬁrms realise that they can charge higher discriminating prices
to its locked in customers base, they have an incentive to build market share. This
in turn leads to ﬁrst period prices below the non-discriminating counterparts. In-
deed, in Chen’s model ﬁrst-period prices are even below marginal cost. As a whole,
Chen shows that total proﬁts with price discrimination are always lower than if price
discrimination were not permitted. In spite of the consumer surplus effect of price
discrimination is ambiguous, welfare is clearly higher without price discrimination.
Of course, because aggregate output is constant, welfare is lower with price discrim-
ination because it induces inefﬁcient switching.
Finally, Taylor (2003) extends Chen’s model to many periods and many ﬁrms.
Like Chen, he ﬁnds that price discrimination is bad for proﬁts and welfare. An in-
teresting point in his analysis is that while in a duopolistic market ﬁrms earn pos-
16 For a detailed survey of switching costs and their effects see Farrel and Klemperer (2007).
17 The Shaffer and Zhang’s (2000) model presented before also studies third-degree price discrim-
ination in markets with switching costs. However, their model corresponds to the second-period of
the models presented here.
18 While transaction costs are incurred every time the consumer switches, learning costs are only
incurred the ﬁrst time the consumer uses a new brand.
19 An interesting feature of Chen’s model is that because a ﬁrm’s old and new customers are in
unconnected markets, second-period prices do not depend on market shares.12 Rosa Branca Esteves
itive proﬁts on its base of old customers as well as on its base of new customers,
in markets with more than two ﬁrms, ﬁrms earn positive rents on their base of old
customers but zero expected proﬁts per new customer attracted.
In short, BBPD in markets with exogenous switching costs leads ﬁrms to charge
ﬁrst period prices below their non-discrimination counterparts and then to raise their
prices once consumers are locked in. (In these models old (loyal) customers pay
always higher prices than ﬁrst time customers.) In general, proﬁts and welfare are
lower than if ﬁrms were unable to price discriminate.
4.2 Differentiated Products and Exogenous Brand Preferences
The set of models that have analysed price discrimination based on consumer past
behaviour within this second approach assumes that ﬁrms offer horizontally differ-
entiated products (rather than homogenous products) and that there are no switching
costs. Here the fact that a consumer chose a given ﬁrm’s product in the past reveals
to that ﬁrm, under certain conditions, that he has a preference for that product. It
is worth noting that consumers’ preferences should be unchanging (or at least cor-
related) over time; otherwise purchase history would be completely uninformative.
Hence, if preferences are ﬁxed across periods, by observing each consumer past
behaviour decisions, each ﬁrm identiﬁes in the next period two separate markets:
its previous clientele (i.e. its strong market) and the rival’s customers (i.e. its weak
market). If price discrimination is permitted, each ﬁrm can try to poach those cus-
tomers who have been revealed to prefer the rival’s product by offering them lower
prices. As mentioned before Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) designate this strategy as
customer poaching.
The models that have analysed BBPD within the exogenous brand preferences
approach are Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Esteves (2007) and
Chen and Zhang (2008).20
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consider a two period version of the classic linear-
city model in which consumers’ preferences are distributed on an interval between
the two ﬁrms serving the market. In the second period, ﬁrms recognise those cus-
tomers that bought from them before and price discriminate accordingly. Thus,
each ﬁrm will target the rival’s previous customers with lower prices than its old
customers. Again because each ﬁrm tries to poach each other’s customers, price
discrimination acts to intensify competition. Although loyal consumers pay higher
prices than new customers, price discrimination intensiﬁes competition thereby re-
ducing both segment prices. As a result of that, consumers are better off but ﬁrms
ﬁnd themselves in the classic prisoner’s dilemma. In contrast to the switching cost
approach, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ﬁnd that ﬁrst-period prices are above the
non-discrimination counterparts. (It is worth mentioning that if consumers were
myopic ﬁrst period prices would be the same regardless of whether or not customer
20 For models of BBPD in a monopoly setting see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and
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poaching is permitted.) The intuition for ﬁrst-period prices above the static levels
runs as follows. Given that non myopic consumers realise that second period poach-
ing will give rise to lower second period prices, they become less elastic in period 1.
Consequently, ﬁrms are able to quote higher ﬁrst period prices than if poaching were
notpermitted.Thus,yetincontrastwiththeexogenousswitchingcostapproachhere
prices fall over time. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for proﬁts and welfare,
though good for some consumers. Once more, because aggregate output is constant
in both price regimes (i.e. uniform pricing and price discrimination) and because
some consumers are effectively poached in equilibrium (i.e. each ﬁrm sells to some
of the competitor’s previous clientele), there is inefﬁcient switching, which clearly
is not good for social welfare.
Villas-Boas (1999) studies a related but inﬁnite-period, overlapping-generations
model in which ﬁrms can only price discriminate between loyal and ﬁrst-time cus-
tomers, which means that ﬁrms cannot distinguish between new and the rival’s pre-
vious customers. As in Fudenberg and Tirole, he ﬁnds that price discrimination en-
abled by customer recognition leads to lower prices and proﬁts. Further, he shows
that as ﬁrms foresee the negative effects of price discrimination, which are greater
the higher is the size of previous clientele, ﬁrms have less incentives to build market
share, thereby competing less aggressively in the initial period. As a result of that
ﬁrst period prices are above the non-discrimination counterparts. Again because
some consumers are in effect poached in equilibrium, price discrimination is bad
for welfare and proﬁts, but good for consumers.
Finally, Chen and Zhang (2008) revisit the proﬁtability issue of BBPD using a
discrete version of the Fudenberg and Tirole’s two-period model. Speciﬁcally, they
assume that each ﬁrm has an exogenous “loyal” captive segment of consumers who
always buy from a particular ﬁrm as long as the ﬁrm’s price is not above their reser-
vation price, and who cannot be induced to switch. They further assume that there is
a segment of price-sensitive consumers (or switchers) with a reservation value lower
than the loyal customers’ one, who always purchase from the ﬁrm offering the low-
est price. Thus, ﬁrms compete only for switchers. In this framework, they show
that by observing each customer past behaviour, ﬁrms might become able to know
whether a consumer is a price sensitive or a captive customer. However, customer
recognition will only occur if a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-period price is high enough such that it
is not accepted by all consumers. In doing so, they show that price discrimination
based on purchase history will allow a ﬁrm to increase sales without damaging the
proﬁts it can extract from its locked in customers. A general result in their analysis
is that second-period proﬁts are higher with price discrimination. Hence, as price
discrimination may beneﬁt ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that the pursuit of customer recognition
motivates ﬁrms to price high in the ﬁrst period, which in turn induces the rival ﬁrm
to price less aggressively in that period. As a result, ﬁrst-period prices are above
their non-discrimination counterparts. It is worth mentioning that in contrast with
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), in this model ﬁrst-period prices are above the non-
discrimination levels even when consumers are myopic.21
21 A similar result is obtained in Esteves (2009) which will be discussed in the ensuing section.14 Rosa Branca Esteves
Esteves (2007) investigates the competitive and welfare effects of pricing with
customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumer
types is discrete. The use of a discrete distribution for consumer tastes brings new
insights to the literature in the ﬁeld and helps establish the idea that some of the
competitive effects of BBPD and customer recognition do depend on what is learned
about consumer demand, which in turn depends on the nature of preferences. This
paper considers a repeated interaction model, where ﬁrms A and B market their
goods directly to consumers whose preferences are determined by a binary distri-
bution: half of consumers prefer ﬁrm A by a ﬁxed amount and half of consumers
prefer ﬁrm B by the same ﬁxed amount. In online markets, for instance, it is likely
that consumers’ loyalty is limited, meaning that even though ﬁrms may have some
advantage over their competitors due to brand loyalty, all consumers may, never-
theless, be induced to switch. There are only two periods so, being permitted, price
discrimination can only occur in the second period when ﬁrms have learnt the con-
sumer types by observing their ﬁrst period choices.
A relevant contribution of this paper is to highlight the fact that ﬁrms may es-
chew learning the consumer types as a way to avoid subsequent price discrimina-
tion and a less favourable competitive outcome. It shows that when initial market
shares are asymmetric (100-0 division) nothing is learnt about consumers, and sub-
sequent prices and proﬁts are higher. In contrast, with symmetric market shares,
consumer types are fully revealed and second period prices and proﬁts fall. Conse-
quently, it is shown that forward looking ﬁrms have an incentive not to share the
market in period 1, so as to avoid learning and therefore the negative effects of price
discrimination. In relation to this second proﬁt effect consideration, it is shown that
ﬁrms price below the static or no-discrimination levels in period 1.22 Given that the
model predicts the existence of a bias towards asymmetric outcomes in period 1,
the paper also investigates the circumstances in which an asymmetric pure strategy
equilibrium could exist in the initial period, where the same ﬁrm serves the entire
market. It is shown that there is sometimes an asymmetric equilibrium in the ﬁrst
period, where one ﬁrm sets a low price and captures all consumers while the ri-
val ﬁnds it not proﬁtable to match the low price ﬁrm because its proﬁts will then
be low in the second period. This ﬁnding suggests that in a many period game the
uniform pricing could be sustained without any explicit collective action. Finally,
the paper sheds light on the welfare effects of BBPD in markets where ﬁrms set
prices randomly. A common prediction in the existing literature on BBPD is that
price discrimination can be welfare reducing due to excessive switching (e.g. Fu-
denberg and Tirole (2000)). Here, in contrast, as random pricing tends to generate
some inefﬁcient shopping, price discrimination can act to increase efﬁciency.
22 Fudenberg and Tirole (2000, p. 643) claim that the effects of behaviour-based price discrimina-
tion on ﬁrst period prices in the brand preference approach are the reverse of those effects in the
switching costs approach. Here, in contrast, we ﬁnd that BBPD may lead to the same lower ﬁrst
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4.3 Homogeneous Products, Advertising and Imperfectly Informed
Consumers
As aforementioned the literature on BBPD has hitherto focused on the assumption
that ﬁrms can reach costlessly all potential consumers—i.e., on the assumption that
there is no role for advertising and that consumers are perfectly informed. Esteves
(2009) departs from this hypothesis by assuming that without advertising consumers
are uninformed and ﬁrms have no demand. The paper addresses a two-period model
with two identical ﬁrms advertising a new homogeneous product (and its price) to
otherwise uninformed consumers. In period 1, each ﬁrm chooses what price to quote
in its ads and an intensity of advertising that will be used in the current period as
well as in the next one. After ﬁrms have sent their ads, ex-ante uninformed identical
consumers will be differentiated on an informational basis. Some consumers will
receive ads from both ﬁrms, will be selective (or price-sensitive) customers and will
always buy from the lowest-priced known ﬁrm. Other consumers will receive ads
from only one ﬁrm, will be captive customers and will buy from that ﬁrm provided
that the price does not exceed the reservation value. Finally, some consumers will
remain uninformed because they will receive no ads. In this setting, when a ﬁrm
is in the market for more than one period, it may learn whether or not a previous
contacted consumer bought its product. If a ﬁrm achieves that type of learning, it
will face in the second period, two separate markets—that of its own customers and
that of its rival’s customers—and so it may be tempted to poach the rival’s previous
customers by sending targeted ads with lower prices to that group of customers. The
paper shows that only the ﬁrm that advertises the higher ﬁrst-period price will have
information to employ BBPD in the second period. In period 1, the high-price ﬁrm
sells only to consumers that are reached by its ads but not by the ads of the rival and
therefore, using the list of people its advertisements have reached and the people
who actually buy from it, the ﬁrm can, at the end of period 1, identify consumers
who are aware of its product but have bought from the rival, and then offer them
(targeted) price discount in period 2. The low-price ﬁrm in period 1 cannot make
this distinction because all consumers reached by its ads buy from it. In period 2,
the single discriminating ﬁrm, simply charges the monopoly price to its captive cus-
tomers and competes in an unrestrained fashion with the rival ﬁrm over consumers
that are aware of it but bought from the rival previously. In this competition, the
non-discriminating ﬁrm is much less aggressive. This leads to an asymmetric mixed
strategy price equilibrium in period 2 where the non-discriminating ﬁrm ﬁnds it-
self somewhat handicapped by its inability to price discriminate in order to properly
protect its consumers from poaching by an aggressive (discriminating) rival ﬁrm. As
forward looking ﬁrms anticipate higher second period proﬁts due to discrimination,
they have an incentive to price high in period 1 as a way to secure the discriminating
position. This softens price competition in period 1, leading ﬁrst-period prices to be
(ﬁrst order stochastic) larger than in the case of no discrimination. In contrast, to the
extant literature (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)), the model predicts that BBPD
may lead at least some consumers to pay higher prices in both periods.16 Rosa Branca Esteves
Regarding the proﬁtability of BBPD, the main ﬁnding is that, when advertising
costs are not too high, price discrimination boosts overall expected proﬁts, regard-
less of the advertising technology in consideration. An interesting and novel result
of the paper is that when advertising costs are high, there is more advertising with
discrimination; when advertising is cheap, the reverse happens. The intuition for this
resultbuildsonthebeneﬁtofpricediscrimination.Whendiscriminationispermitted
each ﬁrm has dynamic incentives (i) to become the discriminating ﬁrm and (ii) to in-
duce the non-discriminating ﬁrm to play less aggressively in the subsequent period.
While the former goal is achieved by pricing strategically high in period 1, the lat-
ter goal is achieved by choosing a ﬁrst-period advertising intensity that strategically
increases the non-discriminating ﬁrm’s captive segment. Thus, a relevant contribu-
tion of the paper is to highlight that in comparison to the no-discrimination case,
the permission of BBPD leads ﬁrms to strategically alter their advertising choices
in period 1 as a way to induce a softer behavior by the non-discriminating ﬁrm in
period 2. For the same reason, it is shown that, unlike the no-discrimination case,
neither ﬁrm chooses full market coverage when advertising is costless.
Finally, another theme of the paper is to investigate the welfare effects of BBPD
in a market where consumers are not fully informed and where advertising is needed
to generate demand. Under no-discrimination it is shown that ﬁrms choose the social
optimal level of advertising. In contrast, with discrimination, it is shown that ﬁrms
underadvertise when advertising is cheap, and they overadvertise when advertising
costs are high. Apart from the special case where the advertising cost is such that
price discrimination has no effect on advertising decisions, it is shown that BBPD
is always bad for welfare. The proﬁt and the welfare effects of price discrimination
suggest that, at least when advertising costs are not too high, consumer surplus falls
when discrimination is permitted. Thus, the paper highlights the importance of tak-
ing into account different forms of market competition when public policy tries to
evaluate the proﬁt and welfare effects of BBPD.
4.4 Remarks
As behaviour-based price discrimination has gained popularity many interesting
questions arose. Is it really in the best interest of ﬁrms to recognise customers with
differentpastbehaviourandtopricediscriminateaccordingly?Or,isitratherintheir
interest to avoid any possible learning and thereby price discrimination practices?
Should consumers hide their true types, i.e., should they behave anonymously? Fur-
ther, should government regulation restrict information collection and price discrim-
ination practices?
This survey has highlighted that conclusions regarding proﬁt and welfare effects
of price discrimination do depend upon the form of consumer heterogeneity, mar-
ket structure and the available instruments for price discrimination. In imperfectly
competitive markets exhibiting best-response asymmetry, it can be said that as long
as both ﬁrms try to poach each other’s customers, they will ﬁnd themselves in theA Survey on the Economics of Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination 17
classic Prisoner’s Dilemma: even though ﬁrms would like to collectively commit to
non-discrimination, individually price discrimination is a dominant strategy. When
the exclusive effect of price discrimination is to give rise to inefﬁcient switching—
i.e. when there is no role for price discrimination to increase aggregate output—any
public policy against price discrimination would be socially desirable if the empha-
sis were aggregate welfare. Of course, if the target were solely consumer surplus,
in light of the above, price discrimination could prove to be in some circumstances
desirable.
As Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) argue research on BBPD has so far just
uncovered the “tip of the iceberg” and so there is much work to be done in this topic
in the future.
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